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did not discuss the exception relating to part owners provided in Sec-
tion (e) of the regulations since the plaintiff was not even an employee.
In spite of the clear and helpful regulations supplementing the defi-
nition of a "bona fide executive" employee, it remains difficult to draw
a line with all true executives falling on one side and all remaining
employees falling on the other. All of the requirements of the Adminis-
trator's definition must be met. The requirement that will probably
continue to be most troublesome deals with nonexempt work tolerance.
The courts must still decide on the particular facts of each case whether
work is "directly and closely related," and, if it is not, then whether the
amount of that work exceeds the tolerance.
F. KENT BURNS
Real Property-Personal Restrictive Building Covenants
Although the case of Julian v. Lawton' presented for decision a very
narrow question on the matter of restrictive building covenants and
perhaps turned on an agency question as much as on the construction
of the covenant involved, the case is of interest because of the growth of
residential subdivisions in the last two decades and the almost universal
inclusion of certain restrictions imposed by means of covenants in the
deeds given for the lots in these developments.2 In this case the use
of the term "personal" as applied to a valid restrictive building covenant
is believed to be unique.
In the principal case, the grantor, in conveying certain lands in a
real estate subdivision which he was promoting, inserted in the deeds
certain restrictive covenants one of which stated "that no dwelling house
or other building shall be erected on the tract until the type and exterior
lines of the building to be erected shall have been approved by [the
grantor] or by an architect selected by him .... ,,3 The court held that
the covenant was personal to the grantor and that both the restriction
and the agency of the architect ceased to be effective at the death of the
grantor.
By definition, "a real covenant is one having for its object something
annexed to, inherent in or connected with land or other real property" ;4
it is a covenant that is said to "touch and concern" the land.5 These
1240 N. C. 436, 82 S. E. 2d 210 (1954).
"'The number of decisions in comparatively recent years involving the validity,
construction and effect of agreements restricting the use of real property indicate
the increasing use being made of them. This reflects, it has been aptly commented,
the expansion of the law to meet the demands of home owners for a protection
adequate to the more crowded conditions of modem life." TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL
PRoPEarY §858 (3rd ed. 1939).
'Julian v. Lawt6n, 240 N. C. 436, 437; 82 S. E. 2d 210, 211 (1954).
'14 Am. JuR., Covenants § 19, at p. 495 (1938); 21 C. J. S., Covenants § 22
(1940).5 TIFFANY, LAW OF RF.AL PROPERTY § 854; at p. 455 (3rd ed. 1939).
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covenants "run with the land" and are enforceable for the duration of
the estate without regard to the personalities involved in any specific
transfer or sale.6 Personal covenants are between individuals, binding
only the covenantor and enforceable by the covenantee; their duration is
said to be only the life of the covenantee.7
The North Carolina Supreme Court has denominated as real cove-
nants the following: covenant of quiet enjoyment, covenant of warranty,8
covenant securing a right of way with an annual payment, covenant
that an existing canal shall be maintained, 10 covenant to build and main-
tain a stairway," and a covenant for a railroad to maintain a flag sta-
tion.1 2 The court has also included in this category covenants containing
building and occupancy restrictions such as: those limiting the number
of residences per tract; limiting ownership to members of the "white
race"; forbidding factories, manufacturing establishments, commercial
endeavors, tenements, apartment houses, saloons, sanatoriums, hos-
pitals; requiring a certain minimum cost per dwelling; requiring houses
a certain distance from a road or street; prohibiting the keeping of cer-
tain animals, and other like restrictions.13
Personal covenants in North Carolina cover such agreements as
covenants of seisin, 14 covenants against encumbrances, 15 and, where no
o 14 AM. JuR., Covenants § 19 (1938); 21 C. J. S., Covenants §§ 54, 74 (1940).
14 Am. JuR., Covenants § 27 (1938); TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 854
(3rd ed., 1939).
' "The covenant for quiet enjoyment and the covenant for warranty are in their
effect the same . . . in some cases the courts have noted minor distinctions between
them . . . they are generally regarded as substantially equivalent or identical in
operation and effect." AmERIcAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 12.129 (1952) ; quiet
enjoyment: Wiggins v. Pender, 132 N. C. 628, 44 S. E. 362 (1903) ; Markland v.
Crump, 18 N. C. 94, 27 Am. Dec. 320 (1834); warranty; Wiggins v. Pender,
supra; Ravenel v. Ingram, 131 N. C. 549, 42 S. E. 967 (1902); RAWLE, COVENANTS
FOR TiaTE § 213 (5th ed. 1887) ; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1022 (3rd ed. 1939).
Cf., Smith v. Ingram, 130 N. C. 100, 40 S. E. 984 (1902).
Raby v. Reeves, 112.N. C. 688, 16 S. E. 760 (1893).
10 Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1 (1870).
Ring v. Mayberry, 168 N. C. 563, 84 S. E. 846 (1915).
1 Parrott v. Railroad, 165 N. C. 295, 81 S. E. 348 (1914).
13 These citations are representative only and do not in each specific case hold
the covenant to be real: residences per tract: Stroupe v. Medernach, 196 N. C.
305, 145 S. E. 925 (1928); Charlotte Consol. Construction Co. v. Cobb, 195 N. C.
690, 143 S. E. 522 (1928); "white race": Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co.,
226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1945); Stroupe v. Medernach, supra; factories,
tenements, hospitals, etc.: Huffman v. Johnson, 236 N. C. 225, 72 S. E. 2d 236(1952) ; Bailey v. Jackson, 191 N. C. 61, 131 S. E. 567 (1925); minimum cost:
Pepper v. West End Development Co., 211 N. C. 166, 189 S. E. 628 (1936);
Huntington v. Dennis, 195 N. C. 759, 143 S. E. 521 (1928). These and other
restrictions received approval by reference in Johnson v. Garrett, 190 N. C. 835,
130 S. E. 835 (1925), one of the "Myers Park cases." For earlier cases on this
planned development, see: Myers Park Homes Co. v. Falls, 184 N. C. 426, 115
S. E. 184 (1922) ; and Stephens Co., v. Myers Park Homes Co., 181 N. C. 335,
107 S. E. 233 (1921). See TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 859.
"' Newbern v. Hinton, 190 N. C. 108, 129 S. E. 181 (1925); Eames v. Arm-
strong, 146 N. C. 1, 59 S. E. 165 (1907) ; Ravenal v. Ingram, 131 N. C. 549, 42
S. E. 967 (1902) ; AmERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 12.127 (1952) ; RAWLE,
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scheme or plan for development was present, certain other covenants
concerning the use of land 6 and Negro occupation.17
In other jurisdictions, the search for unenforced covenants similar
to the principal case has revealed covenants requiring a lightwell to be
left between buildings,' 8 prohibiting a grocery business on the land,' 9
forbidding manufacturing on the premises, 20 restricting location and
character of improvements to be made,2' and requiring a certain set back
distance for all buildings.2 2 All of these were considered personal and
each lacked either similar restrictions in the deeds for other lots in the
development or a scheme of development, both of which were present in
the principal case.
Still another case23 reveals a covenant prohibiting a mercantile busi-
ness from being conducted on the property. The court here refused to
enforce the covenant after the grantors had disposed of their nearby
mercantile business. The restriction was considered personal to protect
the grantor's business and served no purpose after the sale.
The combination of (1) a building restriction, (2) an area developed
according to a "scheme," and (3) a refusal to enforce because the
covenant was personal has not been found outside the principal case.
As seen above, cases may have all but one of the features of Julian v.
Lawton.
The case would seem to be well decided and in line with the prevailing
American law on personal covenants.2 4  Certainly little argument can
be given the court on its decision that the covenant was personal, prin-
cipally because of the use of words in the deed indicating that the grantor
as an individual was to be satisfied. Such phrases used by the court as
"without existence or meaning apart from the brain of" the grantor,
and "his aesthetic sense," would seem a fair interpretation of the lan-
guage of the deeds. However, in view of the defense advancd by the
grantor's personal representative and heirs, it would seem safe to assume
that the covenant was expected to run after the grantor's death. The
op. cit. supra note 4, § 205; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 205.
15 Thompson v. Avery County, 216 N. C. 405, 5 S. E. 2d 146 (1939) ; Lockhart
v. Parker, 189 N. C. 138, 126 S. E. 313 (1924) ; AmERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,§ 12.128 (1952) ; RAWLE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 212; TIFFANY, op. cit. sutpra note 4,§ 1022.
6 Craven County v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N. C. 502, 75 S. E.
2d 620 (1953) ; Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N. C. 426, 20 S. E. 2d 344 (1942).
"
7 Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930).18Heimburge v. State Guaranty Corp., 116 Cal. App. 380, 2 P. 2d 998 (1931).
" Shade v. O'Keeffe, 260 Mass. 180, 156 N. E. 867 (1927)."
10 Harrington v. Joyce, 316 Mass. 187, 55 N. E. 2d 30 (1944).
J1 jennings v. Baroff, 104 N. J. Eq. 132, 144 Atl. 717 (1929).
"Baker v. Henderson, 137 Tex. 266, 153 S. W. 2d 465 (1941).
"Allison v. Greear, 188 Va. 64, 49 S. E. 2d 279 (1948).
" 21 C. J. S. Covenants § 33 (1940).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court has thus removed one of the restrictions found in every deed in
that particular real estate development.
Since more specific or definite language in the deeds25 and the use
of certain legal devices 26 can do much to clear up any doubt as to the
real or personal nature of a restrictive building covenant, it is possible
that in the future the careful draftsman can obviate the necessity for the
court's having to designate such a covenant as personal.
WILLIAM P. SKINNER, JR.
Torts-Animals--Liability of Owner for Trespass of
Dogs While Hunting
In a recent North Carolina decision,1 the court held that the owner
of dogs which had, damaged crops, fences, and cattle of plaintiff in the
course of fox' hunts, was liable in trespass for damage done, although
the hunter himself did not enter the plaintiff's property.
Plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining farms in Guilford County.
The defendant, during a period of three years preceding the action, kept
a pack of seven to ten foxhounds that he hunted across plaintiff's land
at frequent intervals, in spite of plaintiff's repeated protests. Plaintiff's
pasture lay between two creeks. The fox was wont to dash between the
creeks during the hunt, and when fatigued by this exercise would dash
in among the herd of cattle with the yelping pack in hot pursuit. Where-
upon, the cattle would stampede, tearing down partition fences, cutting
themselves on the barbed wire, and generally working themselves into
whatever is the bovine equivalent of advanced neurosis.
Generally, the owner of domestic animals which stray onto property
of another is liable in damages for their trespass.2
-" It is suggested that the following might be sufficient: "... shall have been
approved by the grantor or his successors in interest, or by an architect selected
by him or his successors in interest." Also, the subjective nature of the restriction
could be made objective by listing architectural types not desired, i.e., ranch,
modern, colonial, etc.
6 See Huntington Palisades P. 0. Corp. v. Metropolitan Finance Corp., 180 F.
2d 132 (9th Cir. 1950), wherein the covenant read: "No building or other structure
shall be erected or the erection thereof begun on said premises until the plans and
specifications thereof shall have been first presented to and approved in writing by
the Seller or by the property owners corporation, herein referred to, as to outward
appearance 'and design." The result desired by the grantor in the principal case
was accomplished here by means of the property owners' corporation which each
grantee joined by acceptance of the deed.
'Pegg v. Gray, 240 N. C. 548, 82 S. E. 2d, 757 (1954).
2 E.g., Fox v. Koehnig, 190 Wis. 528, 209 N. W. 708 (1926); RESTATEMSNT,
TORTs § 504 (1934) ; HALSBuRY's LAws, Animals § 935 (2d ed. 1931) ; 3 C. J. S.,
Animals § 185 (1936) ; Accordingly, owners have been held strictly liable for the
trespasses of their turkeys: McPherson v. James, 69 Il. App. 337 (1896) ; Tate v.
Ogg, 170 Va. 95, 195 S. E. 496 (1938). And their chickens: Adams Bros. v. Clark,
189 Ky. 279, 224 S. W. 1046 (1920). Trespassing cattle, sheep, goats, horses,
mules, oxen, and swine are governed in practically all jurisdictions by detailed
statutes, which determine "legal fences," liability for trespass, local option as to
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